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Abstract.  Software based biometrics,
utilising keystroke dynamics has been
proposed as a cost effective means of
enhancing computer access security.
Keystroke dynamics has been successfully
employed as a means of identifying
legitimate/illegitimate login attempts based
on the typing style of the login entry.  In
this paper, we collected keystroke dynamics
data in the form of digraphs from a series of
users entering a specific login ID.  We
wished to determine if there were any
particular patterns in the typing styles that
would indicate whether a login attempt was
legitimate or not using rough sets.  Our
analysis produced a sensitivity of 98%,
specificity of 94% and an overall accuracy
of 97% with respect to detecting intruders.
In addition, our results indicate that typing
speed and particular digraph combinations
were the main determinants with respect to
automated detection of system attacks.
1. Introduction
Keystroke dynamics was first
introduced in the early 1980s as a
method for identifying the individuality
of a given sequence of characters
entered through a traditional computer
keyboard [1].  Keystroke dynamics
originated from studies of the typing
patterns exhibited by users when
entering text into a computer using a
standard keyboard.  Researchers in the
field focused on the keystroke pattern,
in terms of keystroke duration and
keystroke latencies. Evidence from
preliminary studies indicated that
typing patterns were sufficiently unique
as to be easily distinguishable from one
another, much like a person’s written
signature [1,2].  Efforts focused on
acquiring keystroke attributes based on
the dynamic aspects of user input. The
results from these preliminary studies
have formed the basis for a software-
based enhancement to login security.
The basic idea is to extract
characteristic signatures from a
particular user’s entry of a login ID –
and use this information along with the
login ID in deciding whether a login
attempt is legitimate. If the typing
characteristics of the owner of a login
ID could be ascertained, then any
differences in typing patterns associated
with a particular login attempt may be
the result of a fraudulent attempt to use
those details.  Thus, the notion of a
software based biometric security
enhancement system was born.  Indeed,
there are commercial systems such as
BioPassword that have made use of this
basic premise [12].
Deterministic algorithms have been
applied to keystroke dynamics since the
late 70’s. In 1980 Gaines [1] presented
a report of his work to study the typing
patterns of seven professional typists.
The small number of volunteers and the
fact that the algorithm is deduced from
their data and not tested in other people
later, results on a lower confidence on
the false acceptance ratio (FAR) and
false rejection ratio (FRR) values
presented. But the method used to
establish a pattern was a breakthrough:
a study of the time spent to type the
same two letters, when together in the
text. In 1997 Monrose and Rubin use
the Euclidean Distance and
probabilistic calculations based on the
assumption that the latency times for
one-digraph exhibits a Normal
Distribution [5]. Later, in 2000, the
same authors presented a Bayesian
similarity based metric algorithm for
identification of attackers [6]. In 2005
Magalhães and Santos [3] presented an
improvement of the Joyce and Gupta’s
algorithm, while Revett and Khan [9]
presented evidence of the existence of a
set of procedures (typing rhythms,
length of the password, etc.) that can
enhance the precision of these
algorithms.  In this study, we employ a
rough sets based classifier in order to
determine which attributes in the input
signature are important to the
identification of a legitimate owner of a
login ID sequence.
The rough set theory, proposed by
Pawlak [8,9], is an attempt to propose a
formal framework for the automated
transformation of data into knowledge.
It is based on the idea that any inexact
concept (for example, a class label) can
be approximated from below and from
above using an indiscernibility
relationship (generated by information
about objects). Pawlak [8] points out
that one of the most important and
fundamental notions to the rough set
philosophy is the need to discover
redundancy and dependencies between
features. Since then this philosophy has
been used successfully in several tasks
as, for example, construction of rule
based classification schemes,
identification and evaluation of data
dependencies, information-preserving
data reduction [7,10]. In this work, we
utilised an implementation of rough sets
(Rosetta – see ref 11) in order to
determine if a set of rules could be
generated that could provide sufficient
discriminatory capacity to automatically
determine if a user was an intruder.  In
this study, we asked 100 volunteers to
enter a login ID.  A small sample of the
volunteers was designated as the
rightful owner of the login ID. They
were instructed to enter it into our
system with full knowledge that they
were designated as the owners and were
instructed to enter their login ID with
the same characteristics every time (on
average 50 entries).  The rest of the
volunteers were instructed to enter the
login ID as many time as possible over
a 7-day period. We recorded specific
keystroke dynamics (e.g. digraph times)
and then used Rosetta to extract a rule
base from this data.  The next section
describes in detail the experimental
method employed in this study,
followed by a results section and lastly
a brief discussion of this work.
2. Methods
In this study, we asked users
(approximately 100) to enter a
passphrase (Login ID) that consisted of
a string of 14 characters
(‘ensouspopulare’), which is composed
of three words in Portugese, through an
Intranet based portal.  Please note that
all subjects that participated in this
study were native Portugese speakers.
A subset of the users (10) were
designated as the owner of this
passphrase and was asked to enter the
passphrase on numerous occasions
(approximately 50).  The entries were
collected over a 7-day period to ensure
that we acquired a robust sampling of
the variations of the input style for
passphrase entry.  For each passphrase
entry we collected all of the digraphs,
the time elapsing between successive (3
in total), the total time spent entering
the passphrase, and the half-way time
Table 1.  This table presents a sample of 5 legitimate users (‘1’ in the Legit? column) and 5 illegitimate
users (with a ‘0’ in the Legit? column).  All other values in the table are the digraph times in mS. Please
note that there are 5 additional attributes not included in this table for the sake of presentation clarity.  The
additional attributes are: W1 (first word), W2 (second word), W3 (third word), WH (half the total time),
and TT (total time). The TX headings in this table represents the digraph number.  Legit refers to whether
the entry was made by the designated owner
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 T10 T11 T12 T13 Legit?
281 344 297 218 375 266 328 266 234 313 515 282 281 1
343 266 875 297 250 719 593 250 235 312 281 282 250 1
375 359 250 328 328 469 406 282 265 344 359 344 359 1
250 328 266 234 375 328 516 266 234 297 312 297 235 1
391 250 578 297 250 328 297 265 282 312 594 265 438 1
390 344 266 312 297 313 375 312 266 531 547 453 235 0
546 625 297 344 360 343 641 313 296 344 469 500 219 0
344 359 266 266 312 266 344 265 266 312 266 438 234 0
531 501 843 344 344 453 656 297 750 344 453 328 297 0
390 344 297 281 297 313 453 312 266 391 390 532 265 0
point.  These formed the objects in our
decision table, which included a binary
decision class based on whether the entry
was from the legitimate user or not.
  Our rough sets software, Rosetta, has a
limitation of 500 objects, so we split the
decision table into legitimate and
illegitimate users (approximately 500 of
each) and randomly selected 250 objects
from each decision class.  We repeated
this process 10 times, and report the
average results when applicable in this
paper.  We then discretised the attributes
(except for the decision attribute) using an
entropy/MDL algorithm.  We then split
the decision table up in a 70:30 split
(legitimate and non-legitimate entries
respectively).  We generated reducts using
the Dynamic Reduct option, exhaustive
RSES algorithm. We then generated
decision rules that were then applied to the
testing set. Since the critical factor in this
study is the information content of the rules,
we were interested in yielding a rule set with
minimal cardinality, while obviously
maintaining high accuracy levels. To
achieve this aim, we filtered the rules based
on support since the initial rule set contained
over 74,000 rules – too large to be of
practical use.  In the next section, we
describe the key results that were obtained
in this study.
3. Results
In Table 1 we present a sample of the
objects in the decision table, which for the
sake of clarity does not present the values
for the word lengths, total time and the
halfway time. We then discretised the entire
decision table using the entropy/MDL
option in Rosetta, on all attributes except for
the decision class.  We then split the
decision table into a 70:30 split, which we
used for training and testing purposes
respectively.  We then generated dynamic
reducts (using the Exhaustive calculation
RSES) option in Rosetta.  Lastly, we
generated rules from the reducts – in order
to minimise the redundancy in the resultant
rule set. Without any filtering, 74,392 rules
were generated.  Since the primary goal of
this study was to determine if a set of rules
could be generated that would allow a
software based biometric system to
distinguish legitimate from non-legitimate
users, to make the system computationally
tractable. If Table 2 below, we present data
on the relationship between the number of
rules (filtered on support) and the
classification accuracy.
Table 2. Results from high-pass filtering of the
rules based on support. We excluded all rules
that had a support less then the specified filter
threshold.  Note that the accuracy was reduced
by just over 2%, but the number of rules was
reduced to 0.6% of the default value
Filter
Threshold
(based on
Support)
Accuracy Number
of Rules
 <= 0  99.1%         74,392
 <= 4  97.8%            2,401
 <= 10  97.5%               604
 <= 20  96.8%               452
The accuracy of the classification task (with
maximal filtering) – segregating legitimate
from non-legitimate users was
approximately 97%.  Table 3 below presents
a randomly selected confusion matrix that
presents the key summary statistics
regarding the classification accuracy of the
resulting classifier.
Table 3. A sample confusion matrix for a randomly
selected application of the rule set generated using
rough sets.  The top entry in the 3rd column is the
sensitivity, the value below that is the specificity.  The
entry at the bottom of column two is the positive
predictive value (PPV), the last entry in column three
is the predictive negative value (PNV) and the lower
right hand corner is the overall classification accuracy
Outcomes 0 1
0 74 3 0.96
1 2 71 0.97
0.97 0.96 0.97
The primary result of this study was the rule
set that was used to distinguish a legitimate
from an illegitimate login attempt. The
primary attributes used in this study were
digraphs – the amount of time required to
depress two keys (in this study keys on a
standard PC keyboard).  We collected all
digraphs (13 in all), plus the time taken for
each word in the login ID, the total time and
the half-way time point for entering the
login ID.  We present summary statistics in
Figure 1 below, which depicts a frequency
plot of the occurrences of the various
digraphs that were found in the resulting
rule set.
 Figure 1.  Frequency plot for all attributes
from the rules (17 in total) corresponding to the
legitimate login entries – please note that there
are a total of 392 instances of all 17 rules for
legitimate login attempts
Additionally, we examined the attributes to
determine if any were more representative of
the rule set than others.  We found that
attributes 7 & 8 occurred in 100% of the
rules, 7,8 & 13 occurred in 94.6% of the
rules, and attribute set 5,7,8, & 13 occurred
in 72.4% of all instances of the rules (392
instances of 17 rules).  This key result
indicates that a subset of the attributes,
primarily 5,7,8, & 13 are the most frequent
occurring attributes and may therefore serve
as a signature for a legitimate login attempt,
for this particular login.  We performed this
same analysis on the illegitimate login
attempts, which we summary with regards to
the attribute frequency in Figure 2. The
analysis of the non-legitimate login rules is
not as straightforward as for the legitimate
login rules.  For one, there are many more of
them – 175 versus 17 for the legitimate login
attempt rules (this excludes the non-
deterministic rule set consisting of 260
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Figure 2. Attribute label versus frequency for
illegitimate login attempts.  Note that the total
number of unique rules for the deterministic non-
legitimate access classification was 175. The
values indicate attribute in the total rule base
rules). In addition, the average rule length
increased from 5 attributes to 8.  Even with
these differences, we can account for 65% of
the data by focusing on attributes 2,3,5,6,7,
& 8 – a reduction of 6/16 attributes (63.5%).
Lastly, there were a significant number of
non-deterministic rules – which were not
able to map attribute values to specific
decision classes.  There were a total of 260
of such rules – and their examination proved
to be quite useful – as they highlight
bordering cases between the decision
classes.  Specifically, we found that in many
instances, the same attributes that were
significant in the crisp rule set were mapped
to different decision classes.  After careful,
inspection, we found that the difference was
based on the magnitude of the attribute –
which in this decision table – represents the
digraph time. For the non-legitimate login
attempts, all digraphs were on the low end
of the discretisation range. For the legitimate
login attempts, this trend generally held as
well, accept for digraphs 5 & 7.  It was
Table 4. A random sample of 6 rules
(generated filtering on support >= 20).  Note that
there is a mixture of deterministic (with a single
decision ‘1’ or  ‘0’) and non-deterministic rules
with two decisions: ‘1’ and ‘0’.  The ‘*’ refers to
either 0 if it appears on the left of a tuple, or the
maximal value following discretisation if it
appears on the right end of a tuple. All rules are
generated in conjunctive normal form from
discretised data
Rule Decision
T2([*, 391)) AND T3([*, 399))
AND T5([*, 238)) AND T6([*,
282)) AND T7([*,274)) AND
T8([*,235)) AND T12([*,368))
AND T13([*,317) AND
W1([*,704))   =>
      0
T1([*, 391)) AND T2([*, 269))
AND T3([*, 399)) AND
T4([*,274)) AND T5([*,238))
AND T7([*,274)) AND
T8([*,235)) AND T13([*,317))
=>
      0
T2([*, 269)) AND T3([*, 399))
AND T5([*, 238)) AND T6([*,
282)) AND
T7([*,274)) AND T8([*,235))
AND TT([*,4204))  =>
 0 and 1
T2([*, 269)) AND T4([*, 274))
AND T5([*, 238)) AND T6([*,
282)) AND
T7([*,274)) AND T8([*,235))
AND T13([*,317))  AND
W1([*,704))  =>
 0 and 1
T3([*,399)) AND T5([246, 289))
AND T7([274,*)) AND
T8([*,235)) AND
T12([*,368)) AND T13([*,317))
=>
      1
T5([246-289)) AND T7([274, *)
AND T8([*, 235)) AND T11([*,
430)) AND
 T12([*,368)) AND T13([*,317))
=>
      1
found unanimously (see Table 4 for details)
that for the legitimate user, the digraph
values for attributes 5 & 7 were sufficient to
distinguish the login attempt in virtually
100% of the cases.  That is, the typing speed
– reflected in the digraph values was
sufficient to distinguish a valid from invalid
login attempt, when combined with a
Attribute Frequency Plot
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specific digraph pattern.  In this particular
case, the combination of typing speed for
digraphs 5 and 7 were sufficient to
discriminate between legitimate owners and
attackers/non-legitimate owners of the login
ID.
4. Discussion
In this pilot study, we used rough sets to
mine a small database of keystroke based
biometric data – using only digraph times.
The purpose was to develop an approach to
developing a situated agent that could be
used to determine whether a login attempt
was legitimate or not. Using a reasonable
sized dataset, we generated a decision table
by including the correct decision class
(legitimate or non-legitimate owner). Our
methodology based on rough sets was able
to predict with a high degree of accuracy
whether the attempt was legitimate or not
based on the decision rules that we
generated from rough sets (97% or more
classification accuracy). The most
interesting result from this study indicates
that the digraph times and specific digraphs
(see Table 4 for details of the rules) were
sufficient to determine whether a user was
legitimate.  As can be seen in Table 4, the
decision class ‘1’ – the non-legitimate owner
took the least amount of time in entering the
characters of their login ID compared with
that of an non-legitimate owner.  The results
of this study corroborate our previous work
[4]  - but in this study, we used the
keystroke dynamics of a series of owners of
a given login ID/passphrase. In addition to
typing speed, there appears to be unique
digraphs that are sufficient to distinguish the
actual owner versus and imposter – the
essence of keystroke dynamics.  This
implies that instead of using all of the
digraphs in a signature for verification, we
may only require a subset of them –
depending on the particular login ID
characteristics of the owner. This reduction
in the number of attributes that must be
stored and searched through reduces the
computational load of the verification
system. The use of rules generated from
rough sets based classifiers can be enhanced
by the addition of more attributes into the
decision table.  With these encouraging
results, we are expanding our analysis using
much larger datasets, both in terms of the
number of objects, but also by the inclusion
of additional attributes.  We hope to
discover what attributes are critical for
particular login Ids in order to tailor the
system so that it can emphasise those
keystroke dynamic features that are
indicative of the legitimate owner. For
instance, in addition to individual digraphs
associated with particular keys, we also
investigated obtaining composite attributes
such as the total time and half time for the
entry of the login ID.  Although these
attributes did not appear significantly in the
rule set, there was clearly a trend for these
higher order attributes to segregate across
different class decision boundaries.  We will
continue to explore the addition of higher
order attributes into our decision table in
order to help increase the classification
accuracy of our biometrics based security
enhancement system.   In particular, we can
explore the use of association rules and
other rule based systems and compare them
with the rough sets approach used in this
work.
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